The latest developments in the process of decolonization of Western Sahara reveal a clear political paradox: the Polisario Front does not reject the consultations led by the United States, but it rejects turning these consultations into a process aimed at imposing a predetermined outcome on the Sahrawi people.
In his letter to United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, Sahrawi President and Secretary-General of the Polisario Front Brahim Ghali reiterated the Front’s readiness to engage in direct and good-faith negotiations with Morocco, under United Nations auspices, with the aim of reaching a just, peaceful, lasting and final solution that guarantees the Sahrawi people the exercise of their right to self-determination.
This means that the door to negotiations has not been closed by the Polisario Front. Rather, the dispute concerns the conditions of the negotiations, their frame of reference, and their final outcome.
This point takes on particular significance in light of the statements by Massad Boulos, U.S. President Donald Trump’s Senior Adviser for Arab and African Affairs, who acknowledged in an interview with France 24 that there is currently no imminent solution to the Western Sahara conflict and that Washington remains engaged in communications with the Polisario Front, awaiting its comments on the Moroccan proposal.
He also noted that the rounds of talks involving representatives of the parties concerned have not yet produced a final settlement.
Herein lies one of the most significant implications of the current situation: the existence of direct U.S. contacts with the Polisario Front means, in practical terms, that no negotiating process can bypass the Sahrawi party or treat its position as a secondary matter.
Even with the adoption by the Security Council of Resolution 2797 in 2025, the resolution itself maintained the objective of reaching a final political solution acceptable to both parties and providing for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara.
From this perspective, Boulos’s statements can be read as an indication that the U.S. approach has so far failed to produce a settlement on the basis of its current framework, rather than as a formal declaration that Washington has abandoned its position on the Moroccan autonomy proposal.
Polisario: Participation in Dialogue Does Not Mean Giving Up Its Frame of Reference
The position expressed by President Brahim Ghali establishes three clear principles for the negotiating process.
First: No rejection of negotiations.
The Polisario Front confirms its readiness for direct dialogue with Morocco under United Nations auspices, ruling out any interpretation that the Front has chosen to withdraw from the political process.
Second: No acceptance of a predetermined solution.
The Sahrawi President’s letter to the UN Secretary-General rejects what it describes as “half-solutions” that could legitimize the occupation or circumvent the legitimate aspirations of the Sahrawi people. This is consistent with the Front’s official position, reiterated in September, that no solution can be imposed by force.
Third: Self-determination and independence remain at the core of the Polisario Front’s position.
The Sahrawi President does not present the issue as merely a regional dispute over a form of governance, but as a decolonization issue. He calls for a solution based on enabling the Sahrawi people to exercise their right to self-determination and independence.
He also called on the United Nations to assume its responsibilities toward a territory that remains on the UN list of Non-Self-Governing Territories.
What Do the U.S. Contacts Mean?
The central paradox is that Washington is now operating within a more complex political space than simply putting forward a Moroccan autonomy initiative and waiting for its acceptance.
U.S.-drafted Security Council Resolution 2797, adopted in October 2025, made the Moroccan autonomy proposal a basis for negotiations, while at the same time retaining the objective of reaching a “mutually acceptable” solution and the principle of self-determination.
Accordingly, the current U.S. mission appears to be aimed at narrowing the gap between two conflicting frameworks: the U.S. position that the autonomy proposal should serve as the basis for negotiations, and the Polisario Front’s position that any final outcome must guarantee the Sahrawi people’s right to self-determination and independence.
This explains why Boulos’s statements are significant even though they do not announce any change in the U.S. position. His acknowledgment that a solution is neither imminent nor tangible, coupled with his confirmation that Washington continues to communicate with the Polisario Front, indicates that the United States itself recognizes that a negotiating obstacle remains unresolved.
The Key Message from the Polisario Position
The Front’s position can be summarized in a clear political formula:
Yes to negotiations, no to prior concessions; yes to direct dialogue, no to a predetermined outcome; yes to a U.S.-UN process, provided that it does not become an alternative to the will of the Sahrawi people.
This is what makes the ongoing contacts different from merely protocol-level communications. The Polisario Front took part in the informal ministerial meetings jointly chaired by the United Nations and the United States in January and February 2026 and presented its ideas and proposals, but it did not regard its participation as acceptance of the Moroccan proposal.
Thus, Washington’s continued engagement with the Front after several rounds of consultations reflects a fundamental political reality: the position of the Sahrawi party and its view of the nature of the solution remain factors that cannot be bypassed in any final settlement.
The available statements indicate the continuation of the U.S. position in support of the occupation, alongside an acknowledgment that no final breakthrough has yet been achieved.
The current situation therefore does not point to the end of the U.S. track, but rather to its entry into a genuine testing phase. Washington can put forward a negotiating framework, exercise diplomatic pressure, and bring the parties around the same table, but it faces a central question: how can the Moroccan autonomy proposal be used as the basis for negotiations while also requiring an outcome accepted by the Polisario Front and consistent with the principle of self-determination?
From this perspective, President Brahim Ghali’s letter to Guterres can be seen as reaffirming the conditions of Sahrawi participation: the Front is ready to negotiate, but it does not regard negotiations as a mandate to surrender the right to self-determination, nor does it consider participation to constitute prior acceptance of an outcome determined by one side.
As the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) approaches its expiration on 31 October 2026 under Resolution 2797, these contacts are entering a more sensitive phase, particularly as the Security Council has linked the future of the process to the outcome of negotiations and the strategic review of the Mission.
Accordingly, Washington can lead the consultations, but it cannot sign peace on behalf of the Sahrawi people.
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